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In this paper we analyse the equilibrium degree of commitment in monetary policy to an independent central 
banker whose preferences are imperfectly observed by private agents. We characterize the incentive compatible 
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of commitment is also characterized. We show that when incentive compatibility constraints are binding for a 
non trivial subset of types of central banks the equilibrium level of commitment involves bunching: different 
types of rational governments commit monetary policy to similar institutions.  
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Recent developments in the debate on the optimal degree of commitment in
monetary policy has focused on the role of private information by monetary
autorities both on state variables in the economy and on their own objec-
tives. How much discretion should ”society” allow in the presence of private
information of the policymaker on some of the state variables in the economy
is, for example, the normative issue addressed in a recent paper by Athey et
al. (2003) where it is shown that the optimal social contract between society,
with an agreed upon welfare function, and the delegated body in charge of
monetary policy involves a simple inﬂation cap. Monetary policy has how-
ever also important redistributive eﬀects and the evaluation of the trade-oﬀs
involved in monetary policy responses may be diﬀerent among private agents
depending on the size of wealth and income non indexed to inﬂation. If re-
distributive eﬀects of monetary policy are important1, the study of the issue
about the optimal degree of discretion under private information has to be
complemented by the analysis of the equilibrium level of discretion the polit-
ical body is willing to assign to monetary targets. In a paper money system
the ”government” or, in a representative democracy, the Parliament have the
task and the power of looking after the monetary system. In the presence of
inﬂationary bias the government may be willing to delegate monetary policy
to an independent agency (Kydland and Prescott, 1977, Barro and Gordon,
1983 and Rogoﬀ, 1985), with chartered objectives. With central bank being
a delegated power in a democracy, the institutional design of the independent
body and the appointment of a speciﬁc agent in charge fo monetary policy
is in the hands of a political body and may reﬂect political preferences. As
Paul Volker once put it ”Congress created us, and the Congress can uncreate
us” (quoted in Stiglitz, 2003). Under no commitment to policy platforms,
1For a discussion of the issues related to redistributive eﬀects of monetary policy in the
US economic history see Stiglitz (2003) and references therein.
2both political preferences by the government in charge and preferences by
the delegated agency with chartered objectives on the trade oﬀs associated
to monetary policy actions may, however, not be accurately observed by pri-
vate agents. What are the implications of imperfect observability for the
equilibrium degree of discretion assigned to central bankers by the political
body? That is likely to depend on the impact of partial observability of
central banker’s preferences on its policy actions.
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the study of how uncertainty on
central banker preferences may shape incentives to pursue precommitment
solutions in the presence of inﬂationary bias. If the central banker’s objec-
tives are not observed by the public with certainty the commiting technology
is less eﬀective and delegation may, in principle, be harder to achieve or even
collapse. Under partial observability of the central banker’s objectives in
charge for more than one period a rational government will anticipate that
monetary policy is restricted by incentive compatibility constraints and will
take them into account in the delegation process. Our aim is to analyze
how incentive compatibility constraints may aﬀect the equilibrium level of
commitment in a simple economy where monetary policies are aﬀected by an
inﬂationary bias and the commitment technology is not perfect - i.e. the ob-
jectives of the agent in charge for moneta r yp o l i c ya r en o tp e r f e c t l yo b s e r v e d
by private agents.
We will consider a very simple setting where a government with speciﬁc
preferences over alternative policy targets is elected, reﬂecting the preferences
of the median voter, for two periods. In order to reduce the inﬂationary bias
he may appoint an independent central banker serving for the same time
h o r i z o na st h eg o v e r n m e n t . I ne a c hp e r i o dt h ea g e n t si nt h ee c o n o m ys i g n
nominal contracts conditional on the information available. There are two
classes of agents in the economy, one of size p have accurate information about
the outcome of the delegation process and, in signing the contracts, can make
full use of this information. The fraction 1 − p of private agents, instead, is
not able to observe the outcome of the delegation process in the ﬁrst period,
therefore, they sign ﬁrst period contracts only using ex ante information,
possibly taking into account equilibrium incentives to commitment by the
government. In the second period they can condition their expectations on
the policy outcomes observed in the ﬁrst period. Being in charge for two
periods as well, the Central Banker will make its choice over alternative
policy targets keeping into account that its ﬁrst period choices may convey
information about its objectives. Subject to such incentive compatibility
3constraints the CB’s equilibrium inﬂation strategies are characterized as the
outcome of a Bayes- Nash equilibrium between the CB and the private sector.
We restrict the analysis to equilibrium strategies that are (weakly) monotone
in the central bank type. In order to ﬁxt h ei n ﬂationary bias problem, after
election, the government may decide to delegate monetary policy to an agent
in the economy whose preferences may diﬀer from the government’s one but
are not accurately observed by the general public2.
Given the incentive compatibility constraints on the CB’s strategies, the
equilibrium level of commitment is characterized and the results we obtain
are: 1. the equilibrium level of commitment is shown to be diﬀerent from
zero, i.e. the government appoints conservative CBs, even in the presence of
incentive compatibility constraints on its CB’s strategies provided that some
observability exists; 2. the equilibrium level of commitment under incentive
compatibility is larger than in the case when the monetary policy outcome re-
sembles reputational equilibria of the Backus and Driﬃl (1985) type, 3. the
equilibrium level of commitment under incentive compatibility constraints
may be lower than in their absence given costless information transmission
over time 4. there exist atoms in the equilibrium distribution of possible cen-
tral bankers. The ﬁrst and second results show that commitment arguments
for the appointment of central bankers may not be eliminated by reputa-
tion considerations, i.e. in this simple setting reputation is not necessarily a
perfect substitute of commitment (see for a diﬀerent view McCallum, 1995).
The third result complements some of the results in Sibert (2002) where in-
centive compatibility constraints on the central bank strategy do not aﬀect
incentives to commitment in the simple two type case. The fourth result
shows that, for a substantial proportion of possible election outcomes, diﬀer-
ent governments will converge to the same level of commitment. This latter
result seems to us of particular interest since it captures what we think is an
important aspect of institutions as commitment devices in the governments
hands: the insulation of the institutions’ objective from the variability of po-
2See Alesina and Grilli (1992) for an explicit reinterpretation of the Rogoﬀ’s model
in terms of a political game where a population of citizens, diﬀering only with respect
to the relative weight which they assign to inﬂation and stabilisation, votes upon the
preferences of the “governor” to appoint. For an alternative approach on the analysis of
the relationship between ”society” and the agent in charge of monetary policy see Walsh
(1995) and Persson and Tabellini (1993). Persson and Tabellini (1997), pp. 37 ss. oﬀer
a critical analysis of the main diﬀerences and analogies between the precommitment and
the contracting approach to the normative analysis of monetary policy making.
4litical objectives. We show that this is a feature of the equilibrium strategy of
the government when the policies adopted by the delegated institutions are
subject to credibility constraints. In the standard model of monetary policy
precommitment, for example, the conservative central banker result does not
necessarily rule out that the equilibrium level of commitment changes when
political preferences over alternative policy targets change.
These results are, of course, limited by several caveats: the economy we
model is the simplest possible economy with inﬂationary bias. We do not
consider shocks to economic variables, the pay oﬀs to the players simply
model inﬂationary bias by using the usual linear quadratic preferences with
no microfoundation, the incentives by private agents to acquire information
about the CB type are exogenously given. However none of these limitations
should aﬀect the results obtained in a substantial way. Including shocks
to real variables that are common knowledge among the public would only
require that in devising the equilibrium level of commtiment, incentive com-
patibility constraints have to be considered in each state of the economy. This
would only make the equilibrium level of commitment depend negatively on
the variance of the shocks (as in Rogoﬀ, 1985) at the cost of complicating
the derivation of the results in a substantial way and without aﬀecting the
major properties of the incentive compatible strategies by the CBs. Includ-
ing endogenous information acquisitio nm a yb em o r ep r o b l e m a t i ca sf o rt h e
analytic solution of the model. Most of the results derived in this paper,
however, are consistent with a simple ﬁxed cost etherogeneity of information
acquisition among private agents and should be conﬁrmed in a more general
model with endogenous level of observability of the central banker’s type, to
the extent that the (equilibrium) level observability is not perfect.
As soon recognized in the literature the behavior of policymakers in charge
for monetary policy and the institutional design problem are both aﬀected
by private information on their objectives. The presence of private infor-
mation may impose self discipline on the policymaker’s behavior and lead
to reputational equilibria that reduce or eliminate the problem of time in-
consistency of monetary policy as shown, for example, in Backus and Driﬃl
(1985), Barro (1986) and Vickers (1986). If, on the one hand, private in-
formation and reputational concerns work eﬀectively as a discipline device,
given the assigned preferences over the trade oﬀs associated to monetary
policy, it is also true, on the other hand, that incentive constraints associ-
ated to these equilibria, may induce costly distortions in policy responses
that aﬀect incentive to commtment and have to be taken into account in the
5design of regulatory framework of mone t a r yp o l i c yb yg o v e r n m e n t s .S i b e r t
(2002), for example, shows that, given preferences over alternative policy
objectives in the society and given a conservative policymaker, the policy
response by the monetary institution to a given shock can be larger under
incentive compatibility constraints on the central bank’s action than under
complete information. She also shows, in a simple example, that, in the case
with two possible types, conservative policy makers are preferred by society.
She concludes that, although incentives to commitment are preserved under
private information, the scope for stabilization policy turns out to be less
dire than in the case of complete information as analyzed by Rogoﬀ (1985).
Commiting policy rules and objectives to agents with private information,
however, is not necessarily so straightforward: the same properties of the in-
centive costrained policy actions that make them more responsive to shocks
may aﬀect commitment strategy at the government level. As it has been
shown in the game theoretical contributions to this problem (Bagwell, 1995,
Fershtmann and Kalay, 1997) incentives to commitment crucially depend on
its observability when the agent is in charge for one period. More generally,
when the agent is in charge for more than one period the impact of incentive
compatibility constraints on policy action has to be taken into account and
the equilibrium degree of commitment has to balance carefully the beneﬁts
from observability with costs associated to distortions induced by incentive
compatibility constraints.
The present paper is rooted in the traditional literature (see Persson and
Tabellini 2000) on the optimal degree of commitment in monetary policy but
is also related to some recent developments in the ﬁeld. The well known com-
mitment approach to the inﬂationary bias problem has been analized (Rogoﬀ,
1985) elaborated by the ”contractual” approach to inﬂation targeting both in
a static (Persson and Tabellini, 1993, Walsh, 1995) and dynamic framework
(Svensson, 1997) relies on perfect observability of the commitment technol-
ogy. The implications of private information for the institutional design of
monteary policy have been discussed in recent papers both in the delegation
approach, Sibert (2002) and in the contractual approach (Athey et al., 2003).
As discussed above, Sibert (2002) addresses similar issues in a model with
shocks and a continumm of central banker’s types, but she does not char-
acterize the equilibrium commitment strategy in the case of a continuum of
types3.
3The issue of commitment observability does not arise in Sibert (2002) since only two
6The optimal degree of discretion under private information is studied in
Athey, Atkenson and Kehoe (2003) in a normative perspective in the con-
text of the dynamic mechanism design literature applied to monetary policy
games (see references therein for other contributions in the same line). In
their context, the asymmetry of information is between the delegating agent
(”society” with an agreed upon social welfare function) and the monetary
authority whereas, in the present paper, we study a situation where the del-
egating body, chooses the cb’s type. They show that, once the contract is
perfectly anticipated by private agents, the optimal policy is static and takes
the form of an inﬂation cap (contingent to publicly observed states of the
economy) and that agents’ expectations do not vary with the monetary au-
thority’s policy choice. Below the cap the monetary autority is left complete
discretion in stabilizing shocks to state variables on which it has an infor-
mational advantage with respect to public agents. Instead, in the model
analyzed here, there is no asymmetry of information between the elected
government and the central banker. The asymmetry of information is be-
tween the central bank and the private agents and the whole issue is about
how commitment by the government and the policy choices by policymakers
may aﬀect private expectations in the future in the presence of imperfect
observability. In a similar fashion we obtain that equilibrium inﬂation in
our model is bounded from above for a subset of government types rela-
tively more prone to temptation. The upper bound associated to bunching
of commitment strategies by diﬀerent types, in our case depends on the de-
gree of commitment observability by private agents, i.e. on institutional
transparency rather than on publicly observed economic variables.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we outline
the model and deﬁne the separating equilibrium and the pooling equilibrium
in the monetary policy sub-game; in section 3 we derive the equilibrium level
of commitment in the delegation stage; in section 4 we conclude.
2T h e m o d e l
As in Sibert (2002), the timing of the game is similar to the one in Rogoﬀ
(1985) except for the time horizon of the appointed policymakers: at time
t = 0 (delegation stage) a government is elected for two periods endowed
possible CB types are considered. For the analysis of noisy commitment and ﬁnite strategy
set see Bagwell (1995).
7with preferences over the trade oﬀs between inﬂation and surprise inﬂation.
It may delegate monetary policy to a CB in charge for two periods whose
preferences are accurately observed only by a fraction p of the population.
At time t = 1, given agents expectations, the CB will set the inﬂation rate
taking into account that future expectations (at time t = 2) by the fraction
1−p of private agents will be set conditional on the observation of the CB’s
current choice. At time t =2t h ep o l i c yg a m ei sr e p e a t e d .
Both in a separating and in a pooling equilibrium a given type of govern-
ment has to aﬀord costs and may obtain beneﬁts from the presence of private
information of the public about its preferences. Broadly speaking, in a sep-
arating equilibrium a tough type will aﬀord costs in the ﬁr s tp e r i o di no r d e r
to credibly signal its own preferences to private agents and will collect bene-
ﬁts in the second period when private agents’ expectations are set according
to its actual type. A wet type will collect beneﬁt from private information
since, in a separating equilibrium, private agents will reduce expectations
about inﬂa t i o ni nt h eﬁrst period and the engineering of surprise inﬂation is
am o r ee ﬀective course of action. In a pooling equilibrium a tough type will
be worse oﬀ in both periods depending on private agents expectations. A wet
type may improve its welfare because it will beneﬁtf r o ms u r p r i s ei n ﬂation
in the second period. We will consider both separating and hybrid equilibria
where some types oof monetary autorities pool their strategy and show how,
in either case, the incentive to commitment is modiﬁe db yt h ep r e s e n c eo f
private information.








t − αg[πt(α) − π
e
t]( 1 )
with αg ∈ Sg(αg) ≡ [0,A G] distributed according to an arbitrary dis-
tribution function Γ(αg). We assume [0,A G] is common knowledge among
private agents. We also assume no commitment to electoral platforms by the
elected government and uncertainty of the public about its preferences, i.e.
about the exact identity of the median voter. This assumption implies that,
at equilibrium, uninformed agents, although aware of incentives to commit-
ment, are not able to infer the exact type of central banker by using z(αg) 4.
The control variable to the government is given by the central banker’s type
4This assumption is made for simplicity. All the results are preserved to the extent
some residual uncertainty about the central banker’s objectives is observed. It is equivalent
8α to whom monetary policy is delegated and indirectly determining the eco-
nomic variables of interest, inﬂation (πt), expectaions and surprise inﬂation
(πt − πe
t ) as the equilibrium outcome of the continuation monetary policy
game.






t + α(πt − π
e
t)( 2 )
where the target inﬂation rate has been normalised to zero and α repre-
sents the degree of temptation to surprise agents, i.e. the inﬂationary bias.
Private agent’s πe
t = pE[πt | It]+( 1− p)E[πt | Ωt]w h e r eΩt is assumed
to be coarser than It. In particular, for the fraction 1 − p of uninformed
agents, α is not observed and is distributed according to a beliefs distribu-
tion function B(α)d e ﬁned over the compact support α ∈ S(α) ≡ [α,A],
where α is deﬁned by a commitment function z : αg → α5. The fraction
p, on the other hand collects an accurate signal about the objectives of the
maginal beneﬁts from surprise inﬂation. Private agents, in formulating their
expectations, conditional on their information set, will minimize the fore-
cast error, therefore the expected inﬂation rate at t =1 ,2 will be given by
πe
t = pE[πt | It]+(1−p)E[πt | Ωt] where, under z(·), It = {α = z(·),πt−1,}
is the information set for the informed agents and Ωt = {πt−1,z(·)} is the
information set for the uninformed agents, where only past experience and
anticipated equilibrium commitment are included.
Finally, we assume, for the sake of simplicity and without aﬀecting the
results qualitatively, that the players do not discount future so that the payoﬀ
function on the time horizon of the game are the following ones: W = W1+W2





An equilibrium of the game will specify a commitment function and z :
Sg(αg) → S(α), a couple of inﬂation rates played by the central banker:
s =[ π1(α), π2(α)], a couple of equilibrium expectations e =[ πe
1,πe
2], where:
to the assumption that uninformed agents in the economy only observe a noisy signal of
z(αg).
5Both the support S(α) and the distribution function of uninformed agents B(α)a r e
endogenous and will be characterized as part of the equilibrium outcome of the game.
However, since the set of incentive constraints in signalling games with a continuum of
types is distribution free, most of our attention will be focused on the characterization of
the equilirium support S(α). The only feature of interest of B(α)g i v e nΓ(αg) will be the
presence of atoms.
9πe
1 = pE[π1 | α]+( 1− p)E[π1]a n dπe
2 = pE[π2 | α]+( 1− p)E[π2 | π1]s e t
according to the Bayes rule where possible.
The game is solved by backward induction, i.e. we ﬁrst solve equilibrium
strategies and expectations in the two periods monetary policy game and
than, given the continuation game, we solve for the elected government’s op-
timal degree of commitment at time t = 0. The solution concept we adopt
for the monetary policy game is the Bayes-Nash concept: this is a standard
signalling game with a continuity of types, whose equilibria have been charac-
terised by Mailath (1987) and, with reference to monetary policy, by Vickers
(1986) for the case of two types, D’Amato and Pistoresi (1996) and by Sibert
(2002) for the case of a continuum of types. Since the speciﬁc distribution
function B(α) is immaterial for the characterization of the incentive compat-
ibility constraints in signalling games, we only need to deﬁne S(α)i no r d e r
to characterize s and e.G i v e n Sg(αg) we will conjecture, and then verify,
an initial support S(α) for the equilibrium level of commitment and, given
α ∈ S(α), we characterize s and e. After verifying that S(α) is indeed the
equilibrium support for α under z(·), we characterize z(·).
Before moving to the solution of the game let us notice that inﬂation
expectation by uninformed private agents are set after the elections and
after the commitment choice by the elected government. The uninformed
agents, in setting E[π1], can anticipate government’s incentive to commit
and reduce expextations accordingly. However, not being perfectly informed
neither about the identity of the median voter (no commitment to electoral
platforms), nor about the identity of the central banker, they cannot accu-
rately observe the type of banker appointed in equilibrium. The equilibrium
level of commitment has, therefore, to balance the cost of information trans-
mission (incentive compatibility constraints where binding) by the monetary
authority about its type and the beneﬁts of reducing inﬂation expectations
by both groups of agents: the informed, who accurately observe the level of
commitment and the uninformed who, anticipating but not observing equi-
librium commitment, also reduce expected inﬂation without enjoying perfect
forecast.
3 Equilibria in the monetary policy game
As stated above the two period game played by the cb is a standard sig-
nalling game. As such it may have diﬀerent equilibria, separating, pooling
10and hybrid. Since the aim of the paper is to study the eﬀect of incentive
compatibility constraints on the optimal commitment strategy by the gov-
ernment, we focus our attention mainly on equilibria that are separating or
hybrid, i.e. equilibria such that the incentive compatibility constraints on
the ﬁrst period inﬂation choice are binding for a non trivial subset of types
of bankers in the support [0,A]. We conjecture and verify later that if S(αg)
is common knowledge then S(α) is common knowledge too at equilibrium,
for π1 (weakly) monotone in α. We proceed by characterizing the conditions
under which a pure separating strictly monotone strategy π1 = τ(α)e x i s t s
over the support [0,A]. We then study the hybrid equilibrium strategy, i.e.
the function π1 = h(α), such that h(α)s a t i s ﬁes incentive compatibility over
as u b s e tσ(α) ⊆ S(α). After characterizing the possible separating or hybrid
equilibria in the monetary policy subgame for an arbitrary support [0,A]o f
central bankers types, we will verify that the conjecture about S(α)i sc o n -
ﬁrmed under the equilibrium mapping α = z(αg)f o rαg ∈ [0,A G]. Finally
the characterization of the equilibrium level of commitment will be provided.
We proceed by backward induction and derive the equilibrium level of π2





2 − α(π2 − πe
2)
s.t. πe
2 = pE[π2 | α]+( 1− p)E[π2 | π1]
which, since the expectations by private agents are taken as given by the
monetary authority, yields the simple ﬁrst order condition as a dominant
strategy for second period inﬂation:
π2 = α (3)
Private agents expectations, given their information set, can be obtained
by computing the expected value of (3) over α conditional on relevant vari-




2 = pα +( 1− p)b α (4)
where b α = E(α | π1)=τ−1(π1), as dictated by the Bayes rule where
applicable and τ represents the strategy in the ﬁr s tp e r i o do ft h eg a m e .I na
11pure separating equilibrium, τ is a one to one mapping from the type space
onto the strategy space satisfying an initial value condition (see Mailath,
1987). Following the literature on signalling games (Riley, 1979, Milgrom
and Roberts, 1982, Mailath, 1987, Sibert 2002) we will adopt τ(A)=A i.e.
the initial value condition such that the most undesirable signal is sent by
t h eb a n k e rh o l d i n gt h et y p ec o r r e s p o n d i n gt ot h ew o r s tp o s s i b l ec o n j e c t u r e
by the uninformed players. Deﬁne π1 = h the equilibrium strategy in a
hybrid equilibrium. The hybrid equilibrium is such that there will exist a
subset of types σ(α) for which incentive compatibility constraints are strictly
binding with b α = E(α | π1)a n dh = τ,h (A)=A for α ∈ σ(α) , where- at
equilibrium- it will be shown that σ(α)i ss u c ht h a tα ≤ A for α ∈ σ(α). We
f o c u su p o nh y b r i de q u i l i b r i as u c ht h a t ,f o rα / ∈ σ(α), h 6= τ and constant.
In order to identify the conditions under which either τ or h deﬁne the
equilibrium ﬁrst period inﬂation, let us characterize τ as the function that
satisﬁes incentive compatibility constraints, given some regularity conditions
on the reduced form pay-oﬀ function of the cb. After substituting for the
second period equilibrium strategies and beliefs, this reduced form is deﬁned
as:











2 + α[α − pα − (1 − p)b α]
the ﬁrst order condition is given by:
−τ + α − α(1 − p)
db α
dτ
=0 ( 5 )
By evaluating (5) at b α = α, the characterization of the incentive compat-
ible τ is given in the following:
Lemma 1 (Incentive Compatibility).
There exist unique a monotone function 0 < τ(α) ≤ A on σ(α)=( α,A],
with α ≥ 0 such that satisﬁes Arg max
π1=τ
f W(α,τ−1(π1),π1) as the solution of






12Proof: Suﬃcient conditions for existence and uniqueness of τ are given
by Theorem 1,2, 3 in Mailath (1987) and we only need to check that some
regularity conditions on (??) for the existence of τ are satisﬁed in our setting.
These conditions are f Wb α(.)=−(1 − p) (belief monotonicity), f Wα,π1(.)=1
(type monotonicity),
∂[f Wπ1(.)/f Wb α(.)]
∂α = − π1
α2(1−p) (single crossing). By type
monotonicity τ(α) is strictly increasing, belief monotonicity and the initial
value condition imply that τ(A)=A. Single crossing requires π1 > 0. More-
over, since τ0(α) is unbounded at α = A and type monotonicity condition
is positive, by Theorem 3 in Mailath (1987), it must be: 0 < τ(α) < α,e x -
cept for α = A.T h eﬁrst order condition on (??) implies (6). Second order
conditions are easily checked to require τ0 > 1 − p ¤
A brief discussion of the monotonicity conditions will help in the inter-
pretation of results to be provided below. The belief monotonicity condition,
given by ∂f W/∂b α < 0, suggests that the CB would prefer to be believed to be
a tough type in ﬁghting inﬂation because this reduces inﬂation expectations
by uninformed agents and, coeteris paribus, makes surprise inﬂation a more
eﬀe c t i v ec o u r s eo fa c t i o n ;t h et y p em o n o t o n i c i t yc o n d i t i o n ,∂2f W/∂π1∂α =
1 > 0, suggests that the marginal beneﬁt of (surprise) inﬂation is increasing
in α; the single crossing condition, ∂[f Wπ1/f Wb α]/∂α = −π1/[α2(1−p)] > 0f o r
π1 > 0 suggests that the marginal rate of substitution between an increase
in inﬂation at time t =1a n dar e d u c e dr e p u t a t i o nn e x tp e r i o d( a ni n c r e a s e
in b α)i si n c r e a s i n gi nα. Intuitively, the weaker the banker, the more he is
willing to pay in terms of future reputation for a unit increase of surprise
inﬂation today. Under these conditions a separating equilibrium exists, is
unique and is described by the solution to (6).
Notice that the conjectured initial support S(α) is such that there exist a
type of banker α = 0 who has a dominant strategy π1 =0 .A sn o t e db yS i b e r t
(2002) the presence of such a type has to be carefully taken into account in
characterizing the ﬁrst period inﬂation equilibrium schedule. Also notice
that whether α is strictly larger than zero or not has been left unspeciﬁed in
Lemma 16. There exist two possible cases: either α =0a n dτ(0) = 0 is part
of τ(α), then we have a pure separating equilibrium in [0,A]o rα = αs > 0
6D’Amato and Pistoresi (1996) and Sibert (2002) restrict the initial support exluding
so that single crossing is strictly satisﬁed for any type and a pure separating equilibrium al-
ways exists on the entire support. D’Amato and Salsano (2003) also study the equilibrium
in the unrestricted support.
13with, given strict monotonicity of τ(α), αs such that lim
α&αsτ =0a n dw em a y
have a hybrid equilibrium, provided that a pooling strategy exists for α in
σp(α) ≡ [0,αs]. In order to characterize both cases we need preliminarily to
prove that, at equilibrium, τ00(α) > 0.
Lemma 2 (Convexity) τ00(α) > 0 for τ(α) satisfying (6) and the initial value
condition τ(A)=A.
Proof: Simple algebra shows that τ00(α) ≥ 0i ﬀ τ0 ≥ τ/α for α ∈ σ(α).
By evaluating the inequality at (6) it is satisﬁed if x2 − x +( 1− p) ≥ 0.
Where x = τ/α. By lemma 1 incentive compatibility requires 0 ≤ x ≤
1. By studying the last inequality we get that it is always satisﬁed with
strict inequality if p<0.75 and therefore τ00(α) > 0f o r0≤ τ/α ≤ 1.


















2 ,1]. The initial value condition requires
τ(A)=A,i . e . x = 1 to be part of the equilibrium and hence, it must be




2 ,1] which implies τ00(α) > 0. ¤
This result is an extension of Lemma 2 in Sibert (2002) in that no re-
striction on the support for the central banker’s type is assumed. The dif-
ferences in the proof are related to partial observability of cb’s objectives in
the present model. In plain words, incentive compatibility and the initial
value condition is suﬃcient to induce a monotonically increasing and convex
τ function. The lemma above is important in that it helps in characterizing
αs and the conditions on p such that either of the two possible equilibria
regimes, separating and hybrid, such that incentive compatibility is binding
for a non trivial subset of [0,A].
A pure separating equilibrium exists provided that the degree of observ-
ability is large enough. First period inﬂation rate satisﬁes π1 = τ(α)a n d
b α = τ−1(π1)o v e r[ 0 ,A], π1 = πe
1 = α.
Proposition 1 A pure separating equilibrium strategy in the monetary policy
game exists for p ≥ p ≡ 0.75. The separating strategy satisﬁes (6), the initial





Proof: To prove that for p ≥ p =0 .75 there exist a unique pure separating





2 α. Therefore the deﬁnition of αs as the value of α
such that lim
α&αs τ =0 ,m u s tb es a t i s ﬁed at αs = 0. Therefore, the monotonic
and convex function for the pure separating strategy satisfying (6) and the
initial value condition τ(A)=A is deﬁned for any α ∈ [0,A]¤
The lemma states that, for the case in which the fraction of informed
agents is large enough, there exist a strictly monotone and convex strategy
such that the weakest and the toughest banker do not distort with respect
to the complete information strategy whereas all other types in the support
downward distort inﬂation. The banker with α = 0 has a dominant strat-




2 α ≤ τ(α) ≤ α. All types in the interior of the support 0 < α <A
will distort downward the inﬂation equilibrium choice and the distortion is




2 α. The intuition is straightforward: the
larger the number of informed agents in the economy the lower the cost in
terms of reputation loss (increased expected inﬂation in the second period)
given a larger surprise inﬂa t i o ni nt h eﬁrst period. Therefore the lower will be
the incentives for the banker to maintain reputation by distorting inﬂation.
As a consequence, if the fraction of informed agents in the economy is large
enough, the distortion due to incentive compatibility constraints will never
v i o l a t es i n g l ec r o s s i n gp r o p e r t i e si nt h es u p p o r t[ 0 ,A]a n dap u r es e p a r a t i n g
strategy exists over the whole support. As expected, the larger the fraction
of informed agents the closer the separating strategy will be to the complete
information outcome of the monetary policy game, π1 = α. This result may
be compared with results in Sibert (2002) and D’Amato and Pistoresi (1996)
where the support for the separating strategy was arbitrarily restricted to
eliminate types such that single crossing is violated.
The separating strategy is reported in ﬁgure 1.
The equilibrium strategy is slightly harder to characterize for the case of
p<p. In this case it is possible to show that a semi separating strategy
exists. The following lemma provides a characterization:
Proposition 2 A hybrid equilibrium strategy π1 = h(α) in the signalling
game exists for p<p =0 .75. Moreover,
a. There exist αs > 0 such that for αs < α ≤ A , the separating strategy
satisﬁes (6) , i.e. h(α)=τ(α), and the initial value condition h(A)=A.
15 
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Figure 1: Pure separating equilibrium, p ≥ p.
b. There exist out of equilibrium beliefs E[π2 |π1>0]=E[π2 |{π1,α}>0]=
h−1(π1) such that, for 0 < α ≤ αs ≤ A/2, h(α)=0 .
Proof: To prove that for p<p =0 .75 h(α)=τ(α)c o n s i d e rt h a t ,f o rαs <
α ≤ A, h(α) solves the same problem as in proposition 1 and therefore has to
satisfy the same initial value problem. Notice that for p<p, τ(α)i sb o u n d e d
from below by single crossing and therefore it must be τ > 0. By computing,
for τ(αs)=0 ,w eg e t l i m




α→A−τ0 =+ ∞,b yc o n t i n u i t yo fτ and τ0 it must be that τ0 =1−p
at 0 < αs <A . This establishes that incentive compatibility is satisﬁed and
h(α)=τ(α)f o rαs < α ≤ A. The proof that a pooling equilibrium exists for
0 < α ≤ αs at h(α)=0u n d e rE[π2 |π1>0]=E[π2 |{π1,α}>0]=h−1(π1)a n da
discussion of these beliefs is provided in the appendix.¤
The lemma characterizes the monotone hybrid equilibrium strategy rep-
resented in ﬁgure 27.
7It is easy to show that ψ(α) is unique in the set of monothone strategies satisfying
incentive compatibility in a subset of [0,A], the initial value condition ψ(A)=A and
ψ(0) = 0. However, since the game admits other pooling equilibria satisfying ψ(A)=A
and ψ(0) = 0 and no incentive compatibility and since the aim is to characterize the
16             1, πψ  
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Figure 2: Semi-separating equilibrium, p<p.
The economic intuition for the reason why diﬀerent classes of equilibria,
where incentive compatibility is strictly binding for a non negligeable subset
of types, emerge depending on p is also clear. For a large enough fraction of
uninformed people the trade oﬀ between the marginal beneﬁto fi n c r e a s i n g
(unexpected) inﬂa t i o ni nt h eﬁrst period and a larger marginal cost in terms
of increased expected inﬂation in the second period is large. In order not
to ruin their reputation and not to be confused with bankers tempted by
inﬂation surprises, the level of signalling distortion that central bankers are
willing to aﬀord are larger, the lower the fraction of informed agents p.A t
p low enough, a hybrid equilibrium emerges since the distortion induced
by incentive compatibility becomes so large that types in the interior of the
support will not be able to separate themselves and will pool to zero inﬂation.
Given that incentive compatibility forces α > αs to strong distortions in the
signalling strategy to warrant future credibility, there exist types α ≤ αs who
limit themselves to acquire the common level of future credibility implied by
ac o m m o na c t i o n ,h =0 ,i nt h eﬁrst period. This result extends similar
results obtained in Sibert (2002) and D’Amato and Pistoresi (1996) for a
pure separating equilibrium, where, in both cases, an arbitrary restriction of
optimal commitment strategy given incentive compatibility binds for a subset of types, for
the sake of simplicity we do not focus on uniqueness here.
17the type space is used to derive τ.
Having characterized the separating and the hybrid equilibrium strategy
such that incentive compatibility constraints given by (6) are binding for
a subset of types in the conjectured support we have to study, now, the
conditions under which this conjecture is conﬁrmed.
Before doing that however, consider that, as it is well known, a third
set of possible equilibria of the game involves complete pooling by diﬀerent
types in the support. We are not interested in pooling per se but rather
on the implications of pooling equilibria in the monetary policy game for
the degree of commitment. We concentrate on a speciﬁc pooling equilibrium
given by s =[ 0 ,α], and e =[ πe
1,πe
2], where, πe
1 =( 1− p)E[π1]a n dπe
2 =
pα +( 1−p)E[π1], that resembles (in pure strategies) the Backus and Driﬃl
(1985) outcome in our simple economy. It is well known that monetary policy
games with private information may lead to reputational equilibria in ﬁnite
horizon too, when the set of possible policymakers types includes a type who
will ﬁnd full commitment always desirable. In our simple model we have seen
that the government with type αg = 0 has a dominant strategy α =0 .T h e
presence of such a type may induce other types in the support of α to behave
in the ﬁrst period. Without loss of generality (same results in the equilibrium
level of commitment would obtain in our simple model for the case of other
pooling equilibria such that inﬂation rate as function of types is constant in
the ﬁrst period) consider the case of a pooling strategy π
p
1 =0 . I ti se a s y
to show that the equilibrium can be supported by harsh punishment by the
private sector as a whole (both informed and not informed) by setting second
period expectations after deviation large enough. As also argued in Sibert
(2002) it could be possible to rule out such an equilibrium using results in
Ramey (1996); however, we are interested in the Backus and Driﬃlo u t c o m e
of the monetary policy game to the extent it will provide a benchmark for
assessing the eﬀects of incentive compatibility on the equilibrium degree of
commitment.
Finally, before studying the monetary policy equilibrium we need to es-
tablish conditions under which S(α) is common knowledge given Sg(αg)i s .
Proposition 3 Given αg ∈ [0,A g] and 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, for any of the two possible
equilibrium strategies τ and h for the monetary policy game such that a)
incentive constraints (6) are binding for a non negligeable subset of types σ(α)
and b) initial value τ(A)=A is satisﬁed , the commitment function α = z
(αg) must be such that z0 ≥ 0 with z (0) = 0 and z(Ag)=Ag(1 − p)/2.
18Therefore 0 ≤ z(αg) ≤ Ag(1 − p)/2. If it is common knowledge that α ∈
[0,A g],t h e nα ∈ [0,A] is common knowledge among private agents, for any
Γ(αg).P r o o f :s e ea p p e n d i x .
The intuition is clear, given the strategy by any possible CB is non de-
creasing in its type in any of the equilibria for the monetary policy game
characterized above, the trade oﬀs faced by the government in appointing a
CB are non decreasing in its type αg. I.e. the larger the weight the govern-
ment sets on unexpected inﬂation, the larger must be the marginal beneﬁt
in appointing a banker relatively more willing to surprise uninformed agents.
This completes the characterization of the equilibrium strategies in the mon-
e t a r yp o l i c yg a m ei nt h es u p p o r tS(α) ≡ [0,A].
3.1 Equilibrium Commitment with incentive constraints
on central bankers strategies
Having characterized the set of possible equilibria such that incentive compat-
ibility is binding for a subset of types σ(α) in the arbitrary support α ∈ [0,A]
we move now to studying the equilibrium level of commitment by an elected
government who appoints a CB in charge for two periods whose strategies
are constrained by incentive compatibility conditions in the ﬁrst period of
his oﬃce. This problem is interesting in that incentive compatibility may
induce separating costs to the monetary authority that have to be taken into
account by the government. It may seem intuitive that the equilibrium de-
gree of commitment would be lower than that would obtain in the absence of
incentive compatibility constraints. To assess if and by how much incentive
compatibility constraints aﬀect commitment we need a benchmark. In this
simple model, due to the absence of shocks, it is easy to see that, in the ab-
sence of incentive compatibility constraints on the central banker’s strategies,
the optimal level of commitment is only limited by its observability. With
perfect observability, p = 1, it is the optimal level of commitment is inﬁnite,
and full commitment obtains at αFC = 0. Under imperfect observability, on
the other hand, the optimal level of commitment is lower (Fershtmann and
Kalai, 1996).
In order to assess the eﬀects of incentive compatibility on the equilib-
rium degree of commitment let us consider the following benchmark when
a delayed accurate signal is acquired about the central banker’s type by
the fraction of uninformed agents 1 − p at the beginning of period 2. In
19this case it will be common knowledge that the cb will misregard any eﬀect
of the ﬁrst period choice on the second period expected inﬂation, choos-
ing π1 = α as a dominant strategy. By anticipating this equilibrium out-
come, the government, in choosing the CB, will trade oﬀ ﬁrst period sur-
prise inﬂa t i o nw i t hs e c o n dp e r i o di n ﬂationary equilibrium. In this case the
government, upon election, will appoint a banker α = zds(·) maximizing
f Wg(α)=−1
2α2+αg[(1−p)(α−Eπ1)]− 1
2α2 which yields zds = αg(1−p)/2,
where the superscripts ds refers to the case where an accurate signal is re-
ceived by uninformed agents with a one period delay. This value will be
our benchmark to evaluate the optimal level of commitment under incentive
compatibility constraints on the cb’s strategy. Of course the benchmark zds
is not normative and simply measures the eﬀect of incentive constraints on
the ﬁrst period inﬂation rate when the second period is played under full
revelation of the bankers type under a pure separating equilibrium.
Another interesting benchmark we will use is given by the equilibrium
degree of commitment obtained under the Backus and Driﬃl (1985) type of
monetary policy, with πBD
1 =0πBD
1 = α. In the case of pooling it is easy to
show that the equilibrium degree of commitment by a rational government
α = zBD(αg) will be given by zBD(.)=αg(1 − p). As simple as it is, this
result is not void of interest: in a simple two period model the reputation
outcome (Backus and Driﬃll, 1985) does not rule out incentive to commit
monetary policy by a government whose type is not accurately observed.
Following the characterization in the previous paragraph we have to dis-
tinguish between two cases according to the size of the fraction of informed
agents in the economy. In both cases we derive the endogenous support
of possible central bankers types given the exogenous support of government
preferences in the economy and the distribution function of government types.
To this aim, notice that the characterization of equilibrium strategies in a
signalling game such as the one studied here is distribution free this will allow
us to derive the optimal degree of commitment for any possible distribution
function of the prior beliefs held by uninformed agents in the economy.
To derive the equilibrium degree of commitment z(·) under private infor-
mation the government solves the following problem given the continuation
monetary policy game:
20Max
α Wg = −1
2π2
1 + αg(π1 − πe
1) − 1
2π2
2 + αg(π2 − πe
2)
s.t. πe
1 = pE[π1 | α]+( 1− p)E[π1]
πe




φ(α)f o r p ≥ 0.75
h(α)f o r p<0.75
Notice that the equilibrium degree of commitment takes into account
the direct eﬀect that the choice of the banker will have on the expectations
set by informed agents, as in Rogoﬀ (1985) and, indirectly, the incentive
constraints associated to the learning eﬀect due to equilibrium updating by
the uninformed agents where relevant.
We move now to characterize the government’s equilibrium strategy. We
ﬁrst derive the equilibrium level of commitment when the size of the fraction
is large enough (p ≥ 0.75) and incentive compatibility is binding for any
possible banker in the support. In this case the equilibrium level of commit-
ment is denoted zs, where the superscripts s refers to separating equilibrium
obtained in the continuation monetary policy game.
We then study the equilibrium level of commitment (denoted zh)i nt h e
complementary case of p<0.75 where the hybrid equilibrium obtains. As we
w i l ls e et h e r ea r ei n t e r e s t i n gd i ﬀerences in the two cases due to the presence
of pooling regions reﬂected in diﬀe r e n ta t o m sb e i n gp a r to ft h es u p p o r to f
the equilibrium distribution of central bankers under commitment.
3.2 Equilibrium level of commitment with high ob-
servability
If the size of informed agents in the society is large enough p ≥ 0.75 the equi-
librium level of commitment, given equilibrium strategy in the continuation
game, can be derived by solving the following problem
Max
α Wg = −1
2τ(α)2 + αg(1 − p)[τ(α) − E[π1]] − 1




α−τ for α ∈ [0,A]




2 α ≤ τ(α) ≤ A
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Figure 3: Equilibrium level of Commitment, p ≥ p.
Where the incentive compatibility constraints hold for any possible banker
in the support and the pure separating strategy is characterized by Proposi-
tion 1.
We prove that zs has to satisfy
−ττ
0 + αg(1 − p)τ
0 − α =0 ( 7 )
That implictly deﬁnes α = zs(αg).
Proposition 4 For p ≥ 0.75, there exists ˜ αg = Ag/2 such that the equilib-
rium degree of commitment is as follows:
for αg < ˜ αg zs(αg) satisﬁes (7)
for αg ≥ ˜ αg zs(αg)=( 1− p)Ag/2
Proof: see Appendix.
The equilibrium level of commitment for p ≤ 0.75 is plotted in ﬁgure 3.
In words, the equilibrium level of commitment is a non decreasing func-
tion of the type of government elected. It exhibits bunching at (1 − p)Ag/2,
22equivalently the equilibrium distribution of possible central bankers will have
to exhibit an atom in A. The intuition for the result is due to the speciﬁc
behavior oftheﬁrst period inﬂation rate as restricted by incentive compatibil-
ity. As it is well known (Mailath, 1987) the incentive compatible separating
strategy is monotonic and has an unbounded ﬁrst derivative at the initial
value. Anticipating this eﬀect, the temptation for the delegating govern-
ment, by marginally relaxing on the degree of commitment, is increasing fast
in the type of CB. There will exist a type of government in the interior of the
support which may have incentive to delegate monetary policy to a CB which
is less committed than the CB appointed by the worst possible government
in the support. This would violate monotonicity of zs(αg). Intuitively, due
the inﬂation being fast increasing in α,f o rαg close to Ag there is a strong
incentive to appoint a less committed banker than A =( 1−p)Ag/2p r o v i d e d
that it is interior in the support [0,A]8. But this is a self defeating strategy
since by setting α > (1 − p)Ag/2 the appointed banker would deﬁne the
worst possible type in the support [0,A]. Therefore there is no proﬁtable
d e v i a t i o ns u c ht h a tα > (1−p)Ag/2. In other words, incentive compatibility
implies monotonicity of the CB’s strategy, which, in turn, implies that the
equilibrium commitment is non decreasing, which requires bunching.
3.3 Equilibrium level of commitment with a low level
of observability
If the size of informed agents in the society is small enough p<0.75 the
equilibrium level of commitment is slightly less straightforward to be char-
acterized. After substituting for the equilibrium strategies in the continua-
tion monetary policy game, the equilibrium commitment will solve following
problem:
Max
α Wg = −1
2h(α)2 + αg(1 − p)[h(α) − E[π1]] − 1




α−h and h(A)=A for α ∈ (αs,A]
h(α)=0 , f o rα ∈ [0,αs]
The hybrid strategy is characterized by Proposition 2 and the incentive
compatibility constraints hold for α ∈ σ(α) ≡ (αs,A]. For p<0.75, α =
zh(αg) has to satisfy:
8As i m i l a re ﬀect in Sibert (2002) implies that stabilization is larger under incentive
compatible inﬂation rates.
23−hh
0 + αg(1 − p)h
0 − α =0 f o r α ∈ (α
s,A]( 8 )
αg(1 − p) − α =0 f o r α ∈ [0,α
s]( 9 )
. It is easy to show, by similar arguments, that bunching occurs on
the right of the support of Γ(αg), exactly as in the case of zh(·). However
a bunching equilibrium also arises for a non trivial subset of government’s
types for αg <A g/2. The next proposition characterizes α = zh(αg).
Proposition 5 If p<0.75, there exist αp
g > 0 and αs
g > 0,w i t hαp
g =
(1 − p)αs
g such that the equilibrium degree of commitment is as follows:
for αg ∈ [0,αp
g] α =( 1− p)αg
for αg ∈ (αp
g,αs
g] α =( 1− p)2αs
g
for αg ∈ (αs
g,A g/2) zh(·)s a t i s ﬁes (7)
for αg ≥ Ag/2 α =( 1− p)Ag/2
Proof: see Appendix.
In words the proposition states that, if the size of the informed fraction
of agents in society is not large enough, the equilibrium level of commitment
will be such that the distribution of equilibrium bankers will exhibit two
atoms. The intuition for the bunching region deﬁned for αg ≥ Ag/2a t
(1 − p)Ag/2 is the same as in the case of p>p. The intuition for the
second bunching region (αp
g,αs
g] is also due to similar reasons: by appointing
α =( 1− p)αg > α =( 1− p)2αs
g the government would appoint a banker
playing positive inﬂation τ(α)i nt h eﬁrst period who will be recognized
by private agents as such, the welfare costs associated to the inﬂationary
equilibrium at α =( 1−p)αg are large enough to warrant governments in the
region (αp
g,αs
g]t ob u n c ha tα =( 1− p)2αs
g.
To summarize: we have derived the equilibrium level of commitment
under imperfect observability of cb objectives, when the equilibria of the
monetary policy subgame is restricted to satisfy incentive compatibility for
at least a subset of cb’s type in oﬃce for two periods. We have shown that
when informational constrained strategies by cbs are taken into account by
rational government the incentives to precommit monetary policy are not
reduced by private information aspects of monetary policy games. In order
to achieve commitment there must exist a certain degree of observability.
24For any given level of observability p the eﬀects on the optimal degree of
commitment due to incentive compatibility constraints is provided in the
following proposition:
Proposition 6 The relationship between zj(.),j= s,h, Fds(.) and is as
follows:
1. for p<0.5, Fs(.) ≥ Fds(.) for 0 < αg <A g, with equality holding at
αg =0 ,a n dαg = A;























3. for p ≥ 0.75,t h e r ee x i s tα
000
g < e αg
such that
½
Fs(.) ≤ Fds(.)f o rαg ≤ α
000
g




Compared to the case of full commitment the equilibrium degree of com-
mitment is decreasing in the government type. However compared to the
case of costless information transmission through a delayed signal acquiring
to private agents in the second period the presence of incentive compatibil-
ity constraints does not necessarily decrease the equilibrium level of com-
mitment. The distortion induced by incentive compatibility is in fact non
monotonic in the government’s type.
Finally we would like to compare the equilibrium level of commitment
in the case of incentive compatibility with the case of commitment under
pooling.
By comparing the equilibrium degreeo fc o m m i t m e n ti nt h ec a s e sw h e n
incentive compatibility constraints are binding for a non trivial subset of
types and the equilibrium level of commitment that would obtain under a
Backus and Driﬃl type of equilibrium we obtain the following
Proposition 7 For αg ∈ [0,A g] and j = s,h, zj(.) ≤ zBD(.).M o r e o v e r :
25 
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Figure 4: Equilibrium level of commitment, p<p.( d r a w nf o rp<0.5)
1. for p<0.75, Fs(.)=FBD(.) at αg = Ag/2 and there exist α
p
g such
that, for αg ≤ α
p
g, Fs(.)=FBD(.).
2. for p ≥ 0.75, Fps(.) <F BD(.) except than for αg = Ag/2.
Proof: the results is immediately derived from the characterization of
zj(.) ¤
The results states that the equilibrium level of commitment in the case
when credibility constraints are binding on monetary policy and some sepa-
ration of types occurs is never lower than in the case of a pooling equilibrium.
The result is somewhat counterintuitive in that incentive compatibility con-
straints induce a separation cost and one may expect these costs to allow
the government to relax on commitment compared to pooling. However it
turns out that the interaction between separation costs and the beneﬁto f
commitment is not that simple. Compared to a pooling equilibrium most
of the separation costs evaluated using banker preferences are larger for α
close to αs. From the point of view of the government this occurs around
the middle of the support (for a symmetric distribution of αg, close to the
median voter outcome). This type of government, as we have seen would ac-
tually like to relax on the equilibrium level of commitment but is disciplined
by the minimum level of commitment allowed by the presence of government
weaker than itself. It turns out that, for αg close to Ag/2, the fear to ap-
26point a banker ending at the upper bound of the equilibrium support of all
possible bankers only allows a relaxation in the level of commitment which is
exactly equal to the level of commitment that would obtain under a Bakus-
Driﬃl type of equilibrium in monetary policy. Under this respect, the result
according to the equilibrium degree of commitment is generally stronger if
separation occurs than in the case when a Backus and Driﬃlo u t c o m eo b -
tains may be intuitively interpreted, therefore, as a result conﬁrming that,
the stronger the anticipated reputational concerns of the monetary autority
the lower the equilibrium level of commitment. In this simple model too
reputation is a substitute for commitment. Not a perfect one though due to
the ﬁnite horizon.
4C o n c l u s i o n s a n d ﬁnal comments
In this paper we analyzed the equilibrium level of commitment when infor-
mation in the economy about government and central bankers preferences
about the trade-oﬀs of monetary policy is not perfect.
The paper provides two new results on monetary policy games with un-
certain central banker preferences in a simple economy with inﬂationary bias.
We extend some of the results in D’Amato and Pistoresi (1996) and Sibert
(2002) and provide characterization for the incentive compatible strategies
with no restriction on the support of preferences by a central banker serv-
ing for two periods whose type is not perfectly observed by private agents.
We studied incentive compatible strategies characterizing the separating and
semiseparating equilibrium. A second set of results characterizes the equilib-
rium level of commitment under imperfect observability and incentive com-
patibility constraints on the cb’s strategies. We show that incentives to
commitment of monetary policy by a rational government are not eliminated
in all of the possible cases when equilibrium monetary policy satisﬁes incen-
tive compatibility constraints. Governments strongly averse (prone) to con-
cede to temptation increase (decrease) the equilibrium level of commitment
compared to the benchmark case when costless information transmission to
uninformed agents occurs in later periods.
Interestingly the equilibrium level of commitment of monetary policy is
shown to be larger when incentive compatibility constraints are strictly bind-
ing for a non trivial subset of bankers in the support than in the benchmark
case of a reputational equilibrium of the Backus and Driﬃl type with pooling
27occurring at early stages of incumbency.
We also show that diﬀerent government may have incentive to appoint
identical bankers: there exist atoms in the equilibrium distribution of possi-
ble central bankers’ preferences. The closer governments are to the middle
of the initial support of political preferences in the society the larger the in-
centive to appoint similar bankers irrespectively of the equilibrium monetary
policy being a pooling, a hybrid or a separating equilibrium. Bunching in the
commitment strategy and similarity in the equilibrium level of commitment
across diﬀerent possible monetary policy equilibrium strategies suggests that
private information may play a role in explaining why small perturbations
in the electoral outcome may not lead to drastic changes in institutional ob-
jectives under imperfectly observed delegation contracts upon election. This
repeated game with short lived governents is not analyzed in this paper:
the study of how incentive compatibility constraints may inﬂuence a newly
appointed government in the choice between a newly appointed agent with
suitable preferences but with an uncertain reputation and an established
agent with inherited pre-speciﬁed preferences and a well reknown reputation
is left for future work.
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30Appendix
Proposition 2.Existence of a pooling region in the semiseparating equi-
librium such that h(α)=0f o r0≤ α ≤ αs.
To prove that a pooling equilibrium exists we need to prove the following
lemma.
Lemma 3 In a semiseparating equilibrium the pooling region is restricted in
αs ≤ A/2
T h ee x a c tv a l u eo fαs depends on the initial value condition and the
parameter p. Instead of integrating (by separating the variables) and forcing
the initial value on (6) we show that an upper bound for αs exists and is
given by A/2 using a simple argument holding under equilibrium properties
of h(α) given (6) is binding. Given monotonicity and convexity of h(α)f o r
αs < α ≤ A and for the initial value h(A)=A,i tm u s tb e
(1 − p)(α − α
s) ≤ h(α) ≤
A

















(1 − p)(t − α
s)dt





2]. Therefore, given the deﬁnition of αs at
(6), it must be true that αs ≤ A/2.¤
We are now able to prove that there exist beliefs such that for 0 < α ≤ αs,
h(α)=0i sp a r to fh(α)d e ﬁned for 0 < α ≤ A, in the semiseparating
equilibrium in Proposition 2. Consider the following pooling equilibrium
strategy π
p





p)E[h(α)], where E[h(α)] =
R A
0 h(α)dB(α).
To prove that a pooling equilibrium exist for 0 < α ≤ αs and h(α)=0
consider the optimal deviation given the out of equilibrium beliefs, where
after observing positive inﬂation the both the uninformed and the informed
agents set h−1(π1)=b α.
31This speciﬁcation of out of equilibrium beliefs is compelling for the frac-
tion of agents who do not observe α. Any deviation to positive inﬂation rate
by types 0 < α ≤ αs is interpreted as an equilibrium strategy h(α)=τ(α) >
0p l a y e db yα0 > αs.
The same speciﬁcation of out of equilibrium beliefs by informed agents is
less natural and deserves a comment: we are assuming here that after devia-
tion by a type they know it should have pooled at h(α) = 0 they misregard the
information about α and choose to rely on the observed inﬂation rate to fore-
cast future inﬂation. Therefore: E[π2 |π1>0]=E[π2 |{π1,α}>0]=h−1(π1)=b α.

















+ α[(1 − p)
©
α − E[π2 |{π1>0}]
ª
the ﬁrst order condition is given by πD
1 = α, whereas the global second
order condition is given by ∂2Wd/(∂πd
1)2 = αp>0. Therefore if a deviation
from π
p
1 =0e x i s t s ,i tm u s tb eπd
1 = A.






+ α[A − (1 − p)E[π1] −
α2
2
+ α(1 − p)
©
α − E[π2 |{π1>0}]
ª
(10)
Given second period equilibrium strategy and beliefs, pooling at π1 =0
pays-oﬀ
W
p = −(1 − p)E[π1] −
α2
2
+ α[(1 − p)
©
α − E[π2 |{π1=0}]
ª
(11)
whereas beneﬁts from deviation, under the speciﬁed out of equilibrium





+ α(α − (1 − p)E[π1] −
α2
2
+ α(1 − p)(α − A)( 1 2 )
32For 0 < α ≤ αs, h(α) = 0 is an equilibrium if no proﬁtable deviation
exists given the speciﬁed out of equilibrium conjecture, i.e. if Wp ≥ Wd.T h i s
inequility, after some simple algebra, can be shown to hold for 0 < α ≤ αs if
(αs)2 ≤ A2/2 which is true at equilibrium, as shown by the previous lemma.¤
Proof of Proposition 3
To show that z(αg) is monotonic in αg we have to show that WG(α,αg)
satisﬁes increasing diﬀerences and WG
α,αg ≥ 0 (see Sundaram, p.257) for any α
and for any π1, π2 and E(π2 | π1) on the equilibrium path of the continuation













2 + αg[π2 − pE(π2 | α) − (1 − p)E(π2 | π1)]
The suﬃcient condition for z(αg) to be weakly monotone in αg is
W
G











≥ 0( 1 3 )
for any π1, π2 and E(π2 | π1) on the equilibrium path. In any equilibrium
of the monetary policy game π2 = α.
In the pure separating equilibrium deﬁned in proposition 1 π1 = τ(α)a n d











In the semiseparating equilibrium deﬁned in proposition 2 π1 = h(α),
for 0 ≤ α ≤ αs, h(α)=0a n d
dE(π2|π1)
dπ1 =0s i n c eE(π2 | π1)=E(α | α ≤
αs)a n dt h e r e f o r eWG
α,αg =1> 0;





dα =1a n dWG
α,αg =( 1− p)h0(α) > 0.
We have established that, on the conjectured support S(α) ≡ [0,A],
both in the separating equilbrium and in the semiseparating equilibrium,
suﬃcient conditions for z(αg) being non monotonic are satisﬁed. Therefore,
at αg = Ag it must be A = z(Ag), π1 = A, π2 = A, E(π2 | π1)=A.B y
maximising Wg(α)=−A2 +Ag(1−p)(A−E(π1)w i t hr e s p e c tt oA ,w eg e t
A =( 1− p)Ag/2. For αg = 0 the dominant strategy is α = 0. Therefore if
αg ∈ [0,A g]t h e nα ∈ [0,A]. Which conﬁrms the conjecture. ¤
33Proof of Proposition 4 (p ≥ 0.75)
To prove proposition 4 notice that zs(0) = 0 and zs(Ag)=Ag(1 − p)/2
and zs
0
≥ 0f o r0≤ αg ≤ Ag. Let us start by noticing that, for any
0 < αg <A g and for any π1 = τ, π2 = α and E(π2 | π1)=τ−1 holding on
the equilibrium path of the continuation monetary policy game the pay-oﬀs










2 + αg(1 − p)(α − b α)
Wg(α,αg)i si n c r e a s i n gf o r :
−ττ
0 + αg(1 − p)τ
0 − α > 0
and decreasing otherwise, equivalently Wg(α,αg) is increasing for
α < [αg(1 − p) − τ]τ
0
that, by using (6), can also be rewritten as
α
α − τ
[τp + αg(1 − p)
2 − α] > 0
Since, at equilibrium α > τ,f o rzs ≤ Ag(1 − p)/2, zs must satisfy
α < τp + αg(1 − p)
2
that is (7) evaluated at (6). Notice that Wg(α,αg) exhibits local non
concavity at α = αg(1−p)2/(1+p2) and this explains why increasing diﬀer-
ences were used proving in proposition 3. Notice also that for αg % Ag,( 7 )
evaluated at (6) yields A = Ag(1−p). To prove the proposition, therefore we
have to establish that, since there exist a type of government e αg such that
for αg ≥ e αg commitment occurs at A = Ag(1 − p)/2.
Deﬁne the candidate equilibrium pay-oﬀsf o re αg from zs (e αg)=A
W
g(A, e αg)=−A
2 + αg(1 − p)[A − E(π1)]
34and the pay-oﬀst oe αg to appointing ˜ A>A .
W
g( ˜ A, e αg)=− ˜ A
2 + αg(1 − p)[ ˜ A − E(π1)]
where E(π1) by uninformed are set given the candidate equilibrium. Sim-
ple algebra shows that Wg(A, e αg) ≥ Wg( ˜ A, e αg)f o r
Ag
2 ≤ e αg <A g.T h e
deﬁnition of e αg implies that for 0 ≤ αg < e αg, zs (αg)s a t i s ﬁes (7) evaluated
at (6).¤
Proof of Proposition 5 (p<0.75).
Prosposition 5 can be proved by using the same arguments used to prove
proposition 4. As before notice that zh(0) = 0 and zh(Ag)=Ag(1−p)/2a n d
zh ≥ 0f o r0≤ αg ≤ Ag. Let us start by noticing that, for any 0 < αg <A g
and for α ≤ αs, π1 =0 ,π2 = α and E(π2 | π1 =0 )=E(α | α ≤ αs),
whereas for α > αs, π1 = h, π2 = α,a n dE(π2 | π1 > 0) = h−1 holding on
the equilibrium path of the continuation monetary policy game, the pay-oﬀs




2h2 + αg(1 − p)[h − E(π1)]
− 1





2α2 + αg(1 − p)[α − E(α | α ≤ αs)] for α ≤ αs
Remember that for p<0.7 5 ,i tm u s tb et h a tαs > 0.
For α > αs similar results as in the previous proposition apply and there-
fore, since zh0 ≥ 0, there will exist ˜ αg such that zh = Ag(1 − p)/2. Same
arguments as in the proof of proposition 4 show that ˜ αg = Ag/2. Due to
the existence of a pooling region, however, the characterization of zh(·)f o r
αg < ˜ αg requires more careful analysis.




g =( 1− p)αs
g and αs
g deﬁned as zh(αs
g)=αs. To prove the result we
proceed in four steps by cheking a few inequalities at equilibrium.
Step 1. We prove that αg ∈ [αs
g, ˜ αg)i tm u s tb et h a tzh satisﬁes (7)
evaluated at (6) for (1 − p)2αg ≤ zh <A g(1 − p)/2. Since lim
α&αszh(·)=
35αg(1−p)2 and zh is weakly monotone with zh(A)=Ag(1−p)/2, there exist
αs
g such that αs = αs
g(1 − p)2.
Step 2 For α ≤ αs it is immediate to show that the ﬁrst order condition
on W
g require zh(·)=αg(1−p). By weak monotonicity of zh(·), there exist
αp
g such that for αg ≤ αp
g, zss(·)=αg(1−p) ≤ αs
g(1−p)2. Therefore αp
g solves
the following equation αg(1 − p) ≤ αs
g(1 − p)2 and hence αp
g = αs
g(1 − p).
Step 3 For αg ∈ [αp
g,αs
g], Wg(αs
g(1 − p)2,αg) ≥ W
g(αg(1 − p),αg)
Since αs
g(1 − p)2 = αs and taking into account equilibrium strategies,
h(αs) = 0, after some simple algebra it is possible to write Wg(αs
g(1 −
p)2,αg)=−αg(1 − p)E(h) − (αs
2 )2 + αg(1 − p)(αs − E(π2 | π1 =0 )w h i c h ,
since E(π2 | π1 =0 )≤ αs, is at least equal to Wg(αs,αg)=−αg(1 −
p)E(h) − (αs
2 )2 whereas, given ﬁrst period expectations E(h) are evaluated
at equilibrium candidate zh(·), Wg(αg(1 − p),αg)=−(h
2)2 − αg(1 − p)[h −
E(h)] − (α
2)2 + αg(1 − p)(α − E(π2 | π1 > 0).
Since, for α > αs
g(1−p)2, E(π2 | π1 > 0) = h−1 = α, this latter expression
can be written as W(αg(1 − p),αg)=−(h
2)2 − αg(1 − p)E(h) − (α
2)2.
Therefore Wg(αs,αg) ≥ W
g(αg(1−p),αg) can be written as α−h ≥ αs.
Evaluated at αs = αs
g(1 − p)2, h(α)a tα = αg(1 − p) is indeed satisﬁed for
αg ∈ [αp
g,αs
g]. For 0 ≤ αg < αp
g is not satisﬁed and therefore zh(·)=αg(1−p)
in this interval.¤
36